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Abstract
We develop a new Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA)-based methodology for mea-
suring the e¢ ciency of Decision Making Units (DMUs) characterized by multiple inputs
and multiple outputs. The distinguishing feature of our method is that it explicitly
includes information about output-speci￿c inputs and joint inputs in the e¢ ciency eval-
uation. This method contributes to opening the ￿black box￿of e¢ ciency measurement
in two di⁄erent ways. First, including information on the input allocation substantially
increases the discriminatory power of the e¢ ciency measurement. Second, it allows us
to decompose the e¢ ciency value of a DMU into output-speci￿c e¢ ciency values which
facilitates the identi￿cation of the outputs the manager should focus on to remedy
the observed ine¢ ciency. We demonstrate the usefulness and managerial implications
of our methodology by means of a unique data set collected from the Activity Based
Costing (ABC) system of a large service company with 290 DMUs.
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11 Introduction
E¢ ciency analysis of production activities is an important issue for practitioners as well as an
area of contemporary interest in both the operations research and economics literature (see,
for example, F￿re, Grosskopf and Lovell (1994), Cooper, Seiford and Tone (2000), Fried,
Lovell and Schmidt (2008), and Cook and Seiford (2009) for reviews). The goal of such
analysis is to evaluate the e¢ ciency of a DMU (i.e. Decision Making Unit, which is typically
a business unit, o¢ ce or branch of a private or public sector company) by comparing its input-
output performance to that of other DMUs operating in a similar technological environment
(typically other business units of the same company). Amongst the e¢ ciency measurement
techniques, Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) has become popular both as an analytical
research instrument and as a practical decision-support tool. DEA is a production frontier
technique with the distinguishing feature that it is nonparametric in nature, which means
that it does not resort to some (typically unveri￿able) parametric/functional speci￿cations
for the production technology but rather ￿lets the data speak for themselves￿ .
Still, existing DEA methods essentially provide a ￿black box￿treatment of e¢ cient pro-
duction behavior, because they only use information on inputs and outputs (and sometimes
their prices) to evaluate the e¢ ciency of each DMU. What happens inside the ￿black box￿ ,
i.e. how inputs and outputs are exactly linked to each other, does not enter the analy-
sis. However, including such information can improve the discriminatory power of e¢ ciency
models without needing to resort to unveri￿able assumptions. In this study, we develop a
DEA-based methodology for e¢ ciency analysis that explicitly includes information about
the allocation of inputs to outputs. In the application, we use Activity Based Costing
(ABC) data of a large service company with 290 DMUs to show the practical relevance and
managerial implications of our newly developed methodology.
The methodology we develop is rooted in the structural e¢ ciency measurement approach
initiated by Afriat (1972), Hanoch and Rothschild (1972), Diewert and Parkan (1983) and
Varian (1984).1 This approach starts from a structural model of e¢ cient production be-
havior and characterizes ine¢ ciency as deviations from this model. Cherchye, De Rock and
Vermeulen (2008) adapted this approach to a multi-output setting that speci￿cally accounts
for economies of scope in production. The distinguishing feature of their methodology is
that it explicitly recognizes that each di⁄erent output is characterized by its own produc-
tion technology, while accounting for interdependencies between the di⁄erent output-speci￿c
technologies. Building on the original idea of Cherchye, De Rock and Vermeulen (2008), we
propose an e¢ ciency measurement method that distinguishes between output-speci￿c inputs
and joint inputs.2 The unique feature of our methodology is that we explicitly include infor-
mation about the allocation of the output-speci￿c inputs to the outputs. This practice opens
the black box of e¢ ciency measurement in two di⁄erent ways. First, including information
1See also Banker and Maindiratta (1988) for an early study on the interrelationship between DEA and
this structural approach to analyzing e¢ cient production behavior.
2Output-speci￿c inputs are inputs that can be fully allocated to an output. For instance, when the input
￿labor￿is used to produce two products and we can observe that 30% of labor time is used for product 1
and 70% for product 2, then labor can be decomposed into output-speci￿c inputs ￿labor product 1￿and
￿labor product 2￿ . By contrast, joint inputs cannot be allocated to speci￿c outputs. A typical example of a
joint input is the compensation package of a CEO.
2on the allocation of output-speci￿c inputs substantially increases the discriminatory power
of the e¢ ciency measurement: our e¢ ciency measurement method has more power to iden-
tify ine¢ cient production behavior. In turn, this should lead to more actions for e¢ ciency
improvement and, consequently, higher realized cost reductions. Second, our methodology
allows us to decompose the overall e¢ ciency score of a DMU into output-speci￿c e¢ ciency
scores and their respective weights in the DMU￿ s overall e¢ ciency. Such a decomposition is
particularly attractive from a practical point of view, as it directly identi￿es the outputs on
which DMU managers should principally focus to remedy the observed ine¢ ciency. Thus, our
methodology should lead to more improvement actions and support managers to focus these
improvement actions on the sources that contribute the most to the observed ine¢ ciency.
As we describe in detail in the following sections, the bene￿ts of our methodology hinge
on the availability of information about the allocation of inputs to outputs. Although per-
fect information about the allocation of inputs to outputs is hardly ever available, many
large companies ￿which are typically considered in e¢ ciency analyses ￿have well-developed
costing systems that provide information about the allocation of inputs (i.e. costs) to out-
puts (i.e. products). Such information is often used for supporting various strategic and
operational decisions such as pricing, product development, and product mix decisions, but
can also be used to de￿ne and allocate output-speci￿c inputs, which is a core element of
our methodology.3 In this study, we will demonstrate the usefulness of our methodology by
means of an empirical application that uses data coming from an ABC system (see Cooper
and Kaplan (1988)). The distinguishing feature of ABC is that costs (or inputs) are ￿rst al-
located to activities (i.e. the ￿rst stage of the ABC system) and, subsequently, these activity
costs are allocated to the products (or outputs). Compared to other costing methodologies,
which often allocate costs to products based on the produced quantities of the di⁄erent prod-
ucts, ABC gives a much clearer and more accurate picture of the economics of the operations.
The use of data from an ABC system for e¢ ciency assessments has, to our knowledge, not
been documented before and o⁄ers rich ground for practical improvements as well as for
research on the interface between operations research and accounting.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces our e¢ ciency
evaluation methodology. In particular, we show how to use information on output-speci￿c
and joint inputs in cost e¢ ciency analysis. This will provide a primal interpretation of
our e¢ ciency evaluation method. In Section 3, we then introduce a dual interpretation of
the same methodology, which uses the same input information in the context of technical
e¢ ciency analysis. Section 4 presents our empirical application and discusses the managerial
implications. Here, we also demonstrate the usefulness of ABC systems when using our
methodology in practice. Section 5 concludes and presents some opportunities for future
research.
2 Primal orientation: cost e¢ ciency
This section sets out our approach to analyze cost e¢ ciency in multi-output settings. After
introducing some necessary notation and terminology, we will introduce our multi-output ef-
3Note that the costing literature uses ￿expenses￿or ￿costs￿rather than ￿inputs￿ . However, expenses,
costs, and inputs all refer to ￿resources that are consumed to produce outputs￿ .
3￿ciency criterion. In turn, this will allow us to de￿ne our cost e¢ ciency measure. Essentially,
the cost e¢ ciency orientation followed here complies with the ￿multiplier￿interpretation of
DEA models. Speci￿cally, in DEA terminology, multipliers then refer to so-called ￿shadow
prices￿for de￿ning DMU e¢ ciency. At the end of Section 2.4, we will provide such a shadow
price (or multiplier) formulation of our multi-output cost e¢ ciency measure. In Section 3,
we will present a dual interpretation of the same cost e¢ ciency measure. Speci￿cally, we will
show that our cost e¢ ciency measure is dually equivalent to a measure of technical input
e¢ ciency that is specially de￿ned for multi-output settings. As we will explain, this dual
representation will comply with the ￿envelopment￿formulation of DEA models.
2.1 Preliminaries
Practical e¢ ciency analysis starts from a data set with T DMUs, which produce M outputs.
As indicated above, at the input side, we make the distinction between output-speci￿c inputs
and joint inputs. Speci￿cally, we assume Nspec output-speci￿c inputs (that can be allocated
to particular outputs) and Njoin joint inputs (that cannot be allocated). In what follows, we
will assume the allocation of the output-speci￿c inputs is observed; this will e⁄ectively be the
case for our empirical application in Section 4 (which will use an ABC system for the input
allocation). At this point, however, it is worth to add that our method can also be applied
if output-speci￿c inputs are not observed. We will discuss the corresponding extension in
Section 2.5. Next, in this section we will ￿rst assume that the data set also contains the prices
of the (output-speci￿c and joint) inputs. We will relax this assumption later on (in Section
2.4). In fact, exact price information will not be available for our empirical application in
Section 4.
More formally, we use the following notation for the observed quantities and prices of
each DMU t (1 ￿ t ￿ T). First, we observe an M-vector of outputs yt 2 RM







with each entry ym
t representing the amount that DMU t produces of the




+ for each individual output m, and an Njoin-vector of joint inputs Qt 2 R
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Correspondingly, we observe a price vector pt 2 R
Nspec
+ for the output-speci￿c inputs and a
price vector Pt 2 R
Njoin





















tQt = zt where zt is the budget (or cost) associated
with DMU t.
As discussed above, a speci￿c feature of our framework here is that it explicitly recognizes
that each di⁄erent output is characterized by its own production technology. At the same
time, we account for interdependencies between the di⁄erent output-speci￿c technologies
through the joint inputs Q; as discussed in the introduction, including joint inputs allows
for economies of scope in production (see Cherchye, De Rock and Vermeulen, 2008). To
formalize this idea, we characterize the production technology of each output m by input
requirement sets Im(ym) (1 ￿ m ￿ M ), which contain all the combinations of output-speci￿c









m;Q) can produce y
mg:
In what follows, we will assume that the production technology satis￿es the axiom of nested
input requirement sets.
Axiom 1 (nested input sets) ym ￿ ym0 ) Im(ym) ￿ Im(ym0):
This says that if a particular input combination (qm;Q) can produce the output quantity
ym, then it can also produce any lower quantity ym0: Essentially, this axiom of nested input
requirement sets implies that outputs are freely disposable. Free output disposability is a
standard assumption in the DEA literature. See, for example, Varian (1984) and Tulkens
(1993) for discussion.4
To assess multi-output cost e¢ ciency, we will need a way to evaluate the joint inputs.
Here, we use the concept of implicit prices.








These (unobserved) implicit prices represent the fraction of the (observed) aggregate
prices of the joint inputs that are borne by the di⁄erent outputs. This is an intuitive concept
from a costing perspective, where some overhead costs are sometimes used by multiple out-
puts (i.e. they represent joint inputs), but it is unknown to the cost accountant or empirical
analyst at which ratio this happens.
At this point, it is worth to stress that the concept of implicit input prices also has a solid
theoretical foundation. Speci￿cally, it parallels the notions of Lindahl prices associated with
Pareto e¢ cient public goods provision. In particular, in this context Lindahl prices represent
the willingness-to-pay of the di⁄erent consumers of the public good. Pareto e¢ ciency then
requires that these Lindahl prices (summed over the di⁄erent consumers) must exactly equal
the market price of the public good (see, for example, Myles (1995)). In our case, joint
inputs Q clearly have a ￿public good￿nature as they simultaneously bene￿t the production
of the di⁄erent outputs m: Given this, the condition that the output-speci￿c implicit prices
Pm
t must exactly add up to the observed prices P directly complies with the Lindahl pricing
condition for e¢ cient public goods provision. We refer to Cherchye, De Rock and Vermeulen
(2008) and Cherchye, Demuynck, De Rock and De Witte (2011) for a formal discussion on
this relation between implicit prices as used here and Lindahl prices for public goods.5
4Actually, the assumption of nested input requirement sets implies that the cost minimization criterion
in De￿nition 2 does have empirical content, i.e. production data need not automatically satisfy the criterion.
This follows from a ready adaptation of Varian￿ s (1984) argument that applies to the case of single output
production.
5Here, it is also useful to refer to related discussions in Chiappori (1988) and Cherchye, De Rock and
Vermeulen (2007, 2011), who present a nonparametric methodology for analyzing (Pareto e¢ cient) multi-
person consumption that is formally close to our methodology for analyzing multi-output production. In
their consumption setting, these authors equally evaluate goods that are jointly consumed in terms of implicit
prices that can be interpreted as Lindahl prices.
52.2 Cost e¢ ciency criterion
Using De￿nition 1, we can de￿ne our criterion for multi-output cost e¢ ciency.
De￿nition 2 (cost e¢ ciency) DMU t is multi-output cost e¢ cient if and only if there
exist for each output m (1 ￿ m ￿ M ) nested input requirement sets Im(ym




+ such that, for each output m,
(CE-1) we have (qm
t ;Qt) 2 Im(ym
t ), and













Importantly, this cost e¢ ciency criterion is intrinsically nonparametric. It does not need
a prior speci￿cation of the input sets Im(ym
s ). It only requires that there exists at least
one speci￿cation of these sets that simultaneously meets the conditions (CE-1) and (CE-2).
Condition (CE-1) is essentially a feasibility requirement: it states that, for DMU t, the input
requirement sets Im(ym
t ) must be such that the inputs qm
t and Qt can e⁄ectively produce
the output ym
t (i.e. (qm
t ;Qt) 2 Im(ym
t )). Next, condition (CE-2) imposes multi-output cost
e¢ ciency: for the given set Im(ym
t ) and implicit prices Pm
t , DMU t must produce each output
m at a minimal cost.
De￿nition 2 is not directly applicable in practice. For a given set of observations S, there
are typically in￿nitely many speci￿cations of the sets Im(ym
t ) that meet condition (CE-1) and
in￿nitely many speci￿cations of the implicit prices Pm
t that satisfy the adding up condition PM
m=1 Pm
t = Pt (in De￿nition 1). In principle, checking the cost e¢ ciency criterion in
De￿nition 2 would require us to verify condition (CE-2) for each possible speci￿cation of
Im(ym
t ) and Pm
t . Clearly, this is not feasible in ￿nite time.
Fortunately, we can derive an equivalent formulation of the multi-output cost e¢ ciency
criterion that can be used in practice, because it can be veri￿ed through linear programming.
It is given in the next result.




+ (1 ￿ m ￿ M ) such that, for each output m, it holds that: if, for some DMU
s, ym
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Thus, DMU t is multi-output cost e¢ cient if and only if it produces every output m
at the minimal cost de￿ned over the set of observed DMUs, while using implicit prices to
evaluate the joint inputs. In view of our following exposition, it is useful to reformulate this
































i.e. the set Dm




the next section, we show that this e¢ ciency criterion implies a natural e¢ ciency measure.
Subsequently, we show in Section 2.4 that this e¢ ciency measure can be computed through
linear programming, which makes it easily implementable.
62.3 Cost e¢ ciency measurement
Suppose we want to evaluate DMU t in terms of the multi-output cost e¢ ciency criterion
in De￿nition 2. We start from the cost minimization condition (1) for each output m. For a
given speci￿cation of the implicit prices Pm




























t ): When considering all outputs m








































￿ 1, with lower values indicating less cost e¢ ciency






has a convenient degree interpre-
tation: for given Pm














for the (multi-dimensional) output that is produced.






is not directly useful because it
requires a prior speci￿cation of the implicit prices Pm
t . In empirical applications, we typically
do not observe these prices. In this respect, we recall that De￿nition 2 (only) requires that
there exists at least one speci￿cation of the implicit prices such that each observation is cost



















In words, this measure selects those implicit prices that maximize the cost e¢ ciency of DMU
t. Intuitively, these implicit prices can be interpreted as most favorable prices for evaluating
the joint inputs. In fact, such most favorable pricing is implicitly used in DEA; see our
discussion of LP-2 below.
Similar to before, we have that 0 ￿ CEt ￿ 1, with lower values indicating less cost






carries over to CEt (but now
for the endogenously selected Pm
t ). Clearly, DMU t meets the multi-output cost e¢ ciency
criterion in De￿nition 2 if and only if CEt = 1.
Importantly, the multi-output cost e¢ ciency measure CEt can naturally be decomposed
in terms of output-speci￿c cost e¢ ciencies. To see the decomposition, let Pm￿
t solve the max















































































In this decomposition, CEm
t measures the cost e¢ ciency of DMU t in producing output
m, while wm
t represents the weight of this output in the overall (multi-output) cost e¢ ciency
measure CEt. More speci￿cally, the output-speci￿c e¢ ciency measure CEm
t (always between
0 and 1) expresses how cost e¢ cient DMU t is at producing output m. Next, the weight wm
t
(also between 0 and 1) represents the share of the total budget that is allocated to output m
(for the given implicit prices Pm￿
t ). Ex post, this can be interpreted as the weight allocated
to output m in the calculation of the multi-output e¢ ciency measure CEt.
We believe the decomposition in (6) has substantial practical value because the output-
speci￿c e¢ ciency measures can guide DMUs when evaluating the cause of their observed
ine¢ ciency as well as when planning actions to improve e¢ ciency. In Section 4, we will
illustrate the application of the decomposition for managerial purposes.
2.4 Practical implementation
A particularly attractive feature of the measure CEt in (4) is that it can be computed through
linear programming (LP). Actually, the solution of the LP problem also gives the implicit
prices Pm￿
t that solve the maximization problem in equation (5). In turn, this enables us to
compute the output-speci￿c cost e¢ ciencies CEm
t and the corresponding weights wm
t , and
so to conduct the decomposition of CEt in equation (6).





























Qs 8s 2 Dm
t
In this problem, the constraints Pm
t 2 R
Njoin
+ and (C-1) make sure that the endogenously
selected implicit prices Pm
t satisfy De￿nition 1. Next, for given prices Pm
t , the constraint
(C-2) ensures that cm
t in LP-1 satis￿es equation (3), which de￿nes cm
t (Pm
t ): As a result, we
obtain that the solution to LP-1 e⁄ectively solves the maximization problem in equation (4)
and vice versa, i.e. the values Pm
t de￿ned in equation (4) and the corresponding values
8cm
t (Pm
t ) solve LP-1.
So far, we have assumed that the input price vectors pt and Pt are exactly observed.
However, in many empirical applications such exact price information is not available.6 In












Attractively, our cost e¢ ciency measures (including the corresponding LP characteriza-
tion) can easily be adjusted to account for such incomplete price information. Consistent
with usual practice in DEA, we use ￿most favorable￿ prices for evaluating the output-speci￿c
and joint inputs in the absence of exact price information: we adjust LP-1 so that it selects
prices that maximize the e¢ ciency of DMU t. In a certain sense, such most favorable prices
may be interpreted as shadow prices that support cost e¢ cient behavior of the evaluated
DMU. Intuitively, (most favorable) shadow prices give each DMU t the ￿bene￿t of the doubt￿
in the e¢ ciency evaluation exercise. In DEA terminology, shadow prices are referred to as
￿multipliers￿(see, for example, Cooper, Seiford and Tone (2000))7. As such, our method for
cost e¢ ciency evaluation (under shadow prices) corresponds to the multiplier formulation of
standard DEA models.
More formally, the use of shadow prices pt and Pt for the inputs obtains the following
LP problem (LP-2):




































This LP problem has a readily similar interpretation as LP-1. The only di⁄erence is the
normalization constraint (C-3) in LP-2. This constraint makes that we can give the objective


















As explained above, the shadow price problem LP-2 complies with the multiplier formulation
of DEA models. Given this, we can consider alternative extensions that include existing
DEA tools in our framework, to deal with speci￿c issues that can be relevant in practical
6See, for example, Kuosmanen, Cherchye and Sipil￿inen (2006) for a discussion of instances where reliable
price information is not readily available. Our application in Section 4 contains another example.
7Cherchye, Moesen, Rogge and Van Puyenbroeck (2007) provide a detailed discussion of the ￿bene￿t of
the doubt￿ -interpretation of DEA models in the speci￿c context of composite indicator construction.
8Charnes and Cooper (1962) originally proposed to use a normalization constraint to convert a fractional
programming problem into an equivalent linear programming problem. In fact, Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes
(1978) also used this normalization procedure in their ￿rst DEA paper.
9applications. Here, we focus on two such extensions that are particularly interesting for our
(multi-output) cost e¢ ciency setting.
A ￿rst extension pertains to the fact that an e¢ ciency analysis based on LP-2 can be
strengthened by imposing price information, which then takes the form of additional con-
straints that de￿ne a feasible range for the relative prices. For example, such shadow price (or
multiplier) constraints may rule out the extreme cases where the relative price of a commod-
ity approaches zero or in￿nity. The technical questions related to incorporating such shadow
price restrictions have been discussed extensively in a DEA context, most commonly under
the label ￿weight restrictions￿ or ￿assurance regions￿ (see, for example, Allen, Athanas-
sopoulos, Dyson and Thanassoulis (1997) and Pedraja-Chaparro, Salina-Jimenez and Smith
(1997), for surveys, and Kuosmanen, Cherchye and Sipil￿inen (2006) for more recent devel-
opments). These tools are readily adapted to the current set-up. Typically, DEA shadow
price restrictions are linear and, as such, they do not interfere with the linear nature of LP-2.
As a speci￿c illustration, we will use price restrictions in our application in Section 4.
A second extension concerns the possibility that, in practice, we do not observe the
output-speci￿c input vectors qm
s but only the aggregate vector qs =
PM
m=1 qm
t . In such a
case, we can use a procedure outlined by Cook, Habadou and Teunter (2000) and Cook and
Habadou (2001) in a closely similar DEA context.9 Essentially, this procedure deals with
unobserved output-speci￿c input vectors under the assumption that the fraction of the input
vector qt allocated to each di⁄erent output m is the same for all DMUs t.10 Formally, we let
the vector ￿m = (￿m;1;:::;￿m;Nspec) 2 R
Nspec
+ represent the fractions of the di⁄erent entries











with ￿ the Hadamard or element-by-element product. In terms of problems LP-1 and LP-2,
this means adding the decision variables ￿m 2 R
Nspec
+ and constraint (C-4). In addition, we
must replace constraint (C-2) by









Qs 8s 2 D
m
t :
For the problem (LP-1), with input price vectors pt known to the empirical analyst,
adding the constraint (C-4) and replacing (C-2) by (C-5) obviously does not interfere with
its linear nature. As such, this procedure for dealing with unobserved output-speci￿c input
vectors is directly implementable through linear programming.
9See also Beasley (1995) and Cook and Green (2004) for related ideas.
10We remark that the assumption that all DMUs allocate the same fractions of the input q allocated to
the outputs m may be a strong one in practical applications. For example, inspection of the data used in our
own application (which contains information on the vectors qm
t ; see Section 4) reveals that the assumption
is violated for this particular setting.
10However, for the problem (LP-2), which uses shadow prices because the vector pt is
unobserved, the constraint (C-5) is nonlinear in the variables pt and ￿m. Following Cook,











Qs 8s 2 D
m
t ;
and subsequently replacing the (Hadamard) product of the variables pt and ￿m by a new
variable ￿t 2 R
Nspec
+ , i.e. ￿t = pt ￿ ￿m. Thus, for LP-2 we do not use (C-5) but, instead,
the new constraint








Qs 8s 2 D
m
t ;
which is clearly linear. At this point, the constraint (C-4) may seem redundant in combi-
nation with (C-6), as the variables ￿m no longer appear in (C-6). This is true (only) if no
shadow price (or multiplier) constraint applies to the vector pt (except from non-negativity).
In such a case, replacing pt ￿ ￿m by ￿t does not put any restriction on the values ￿t can
take (except from non-negativity).
However, the situation alters if the vector pt is subject to shadow price constraints. In
that case, the constraint (C-4) e⁄ectively turns out to be restrictive. This is extensively
discussed by Cook, Habadou and Teunter (2000), who also show how to translate linear
constraints on pt into linear constraints on ￿t (while accounting for ￿t = pt ￿ ￿m). These
authors￿discussion directly carries over to our problem LP-2 with (C-4) added and the
original constraint (C-2) replaced by (C-6). For compactness, we do not repeat this here.
3 Dual orientation: technical e¢ ciency
As we indicated, our multi-output cost e¢ ciency measure that makes use of shadow pricing
can also be interpreted as a DEA model in multiplier form. Its speci￿c feature as compared
to existing DEA measures is its multi-output orientation. Here, it is worth to indicate that
DEA models are most often expressed in ￿envelopment￿form. In particular, envelopment
DEA models measure the technical e¢ ciency of a DMU with respect to a technical feasibility
set (representing the production technology) that envelops the input-output combinations
associated with the observed DMUs. In this section, we will introduce a similar technical
e¢ ciency measure that is specially tailored for multi-output settings. Subsequently, we will
show that this measure is dually equivalent to the cost e¢ ciency measure de￿ned above.
This e⁄ectively provides the envelopment (technical e¢ ciency) counterpart of the multiplier
(cost e¢ ciency) measure presented in Section 2.
3.1 Technical input e¢ ciency
In contrast to cost e¢ ciency, technical e¢ ciency analysis does not use price information, i.e.



















to the boundary of the technical feasibility set associated with
11the given production technology. Like before, we de￿ne technical feasibilities in terms of





is technically feasible if, for all outputs m, we have that
(qm;Q) 2 Im (ym).
To establish duality with our multi-output cost e¢ ciency measure, we assess technical
e¢ ciency in input terms. We use the Debreu-Farrell input e¢ ciency measure, which is the
most commonly used e¢ ciency measure in the DEA literature. For DMU t, this measure is
de￿ned as11
TEt = minf￿j 8m : (￿q
m




In words, the measure TEt captures the maximum equiproportionate reduction (measured by













can still produce the output yt (i.e. for each output m we have (￿qm
t ;￿Qt) 2 Im (ym
t )). Like
in our cost e¢ ciency assessment, the speci￿city of this e¢ ciency measure is that it explicitly
recognizes the multi-output nature of the production setting, by considering output-speci￿c
input sets Im (ym
t ) and so accounting for joint inputs as well as output-speci￿c inputs.
In general, for (qm
t ;Qt) 2 Im (ym
t ) we have
0 ￿ TEt ￿ 1;
with TEt = 1 indicating technical input e¢ ciency. For the given technical feasibility set,
the measure TEt de￿nes the maximal (equiproportionate) input reduction that still allows
for producing the output yt. In general, lower values of TEt indicate greater technical
ine¢ ciency.
3.2 Technology axioms
As it is de￿ned in (7), the measure TEt does not have practical usefulness. It requires
knowing the sets Im (ym
t ). In practice, the empirical analyst typically does not observe
the full technical feasibility set but can only use the production information revealed by
the observed DMUs. Envelopment DEA models reconstruct the technical feasibility set by
starting from these DMUs and additionally using a number of technology axioms. This
obtains a technical feasibility set that envelops the observed DMUs.
To obtain a technical e¢ ciency measure that is dually equivalent to the cost e¢ ciency
measure introduced in Section 2, we need three technology axioms. Like before, we have
to assume that input requirement sets are nested (Axiom 1). The two other axioms are
monotonicity and convexity of the sets Im (ym).
Axiom 2 (monotone input sets) (qm; Q) 2 Im (ym) and (qm0; Q0) ￿ (qm; Q) ) (qm0;
Q0) 2 Im(ym):
Axiom 3 (convex input sets) (qm;Q) 2 Im (ym) and (qm0;Q0) 2 Im (ym) ) 8￿ 2 [0;1] :
￿(qm0;Q0) + (1 ￿ ￿)(qm0;Q0) 2 Im(ym):
11Throughout, we will assume that the production technology has the required properties for the minimum
value in (7) to be de￿ned. For example, this will be the case for the empirical version of the measure TEt
(i.e. d TEt) that we introduce further on (see (9)).
12Here, monotonicity of Im (ym) means that inputs are freely disposable, i.e. more input
never reduces the (producible) output. Next, convexity of Im (ym) says that, if two input
vectors (qm;Q) and (qm0;Q0) can produce the output ym, then any convex combination (=
￿(qm0;Q0) + (1 ￿ ￿)(qm0;Q0)) can also produce the same output. These monotonicity and
convexity axioms are often used in DEA analysis. See, for example, Petersen (1990) and
Bogetoft (1996) for discussion.
As indicated above, a typical feature of DEA models is that they use a feasibility set that
envelops the input-output combinations associated with the observed DMUs. This property
is guaranteed by the next axiom:
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with the output yt, then this input can certainly produce this output (i.e. (qm
t ;Qt) 2 Im(ym
t )
for all m): Or, what we observe is certainly feasible. We note that this axiom e⁄ectively
assumes that all input and output data are correctly measured. Obviously, this may be a
problem in empirical work. Therefore, in our application (in Section 4) we will also consider
an extension of our methodology that accounts for the possibility of measurement errors. As
for now, however, we do maintain Axiom 4, mainly to (substantially) simplify the formal
exposition.
For a given set of axioms, DEA then provides an empirical construction of the technical
feasibility set that satis￿es the ￿minimum extrapolation principle￿ , which means that this
construction de￿nes the smallest feasibility set that is consistent with the stated axioms. For






























with the set Dm
t de￿ned in (2). In words, the empirical set b Im (ym
t ) is constructed as the
convex-monotone hull of the input vectors (qm
s ;Qs) associated with all DMUs s that produce
at least the output ym
t (i.e. s 2 Dm
t ).
The next result provides a formal statement of the fact that b Im (ym
t ) satis￿es the minimum
extrapolation principle.
Proposition 2 b Im (ym
t ) satis￿es Axioms 1-4. Moreover, for any Im (ym
t ) that satis￿es Ax-
ioms 1-4, we have that b Im (ym
t ) ￿ Im (ym
t ).
Thus, any set Im (ym
t ) that satis￿es the Axioms 1-4 also contains b Im (ym
t ). Putting it
di⁄erently, by its very construction b Im (ym
t ) gives an inner bound approximation of the true
(but unobserved) input requirement set Im (ym
t ) (under the stated technology axioms). This
will obtain a speci￿c interpretation for the corresponding technical e¢ ciency measure, as we
discuss next.
133.3 Duality between technical and cost e¢ ciency
Given the set b Im (ym
t ), we can de￿ne the following measure of technical input e¢ ciency:
d TEt = minf￿j 8m :(￿q
m




This measure has a directly similar interpretation as TEt in (7). The sole di⁄erence is that
it uses the set b Im (ym
t ) instead of the true (but unobserved) set Im (ym
t ). By construction,
we have
0 ￿ d TEt ￿ 1:




t ) ￿ I
m (y
m
t ) ) d TEt ￿ TEt;
i.e. the measure d TEt de￿nes an upper bound for TEt. Putting it di⁄erently, d TEt can
be interpreted as a ￿conservative￿estimator of the true (but, again, unobserved) technical
(in)e¢ ciency of DMU t: it captures equiproportional input reduction that is certainly feasible
(provided that Axioms 1-4 hold).
Combining (8) and (9), we obtain that the measure d TEt can be computed by solving the
next linear programming problem (LP-3):

























As explained above, ￿t measures the e¢ ciency of DMU t as an equiproportionate reduction
of the inputs; the speci￿city of our e¢ ciency measurement model is that it simultaneously
accounts for joint inputs (see constraint (D-1)) and output-speci￿c inputs (see constraint
(D-2)). Similar to standard DEA models, the benchmark input vectors are constructed as
(convex) combinations of existing DMUs, with every variable ￿
m
s representing the weight of
each DMU s. In common DEA terminology, the variables ￿
m
s are referred to as intensity












s ) for every di⁄erent output m. This feature
relates to the particular nature of our approach, which explicitly recognizes that each di⁄erent
output is characterized by its own production technology (and, for that reason, its own
benchmark input).
Interestingly, the technical e¢ ciency measure d TEt is dually equivalent to the cost e¢ -
ciency measure d CEt that we introduced in Section 2. In particular, it is easy to verify that
problem LP-3 is dual to problem LP-2. Thus, the duality theorem of linear programming
directly implies the following result.
Proposition 3 We have d TEt = d CEt:
14This de￿nes a speci￿c dual interpretation of our multi-output cost e¢ ciency measure
in terms of multi-output technical e¢ ciency. As we have explained, this duality result can
directly be interpreted in terms of the distinction between multiplier and envelopment DEA
models. As such, it clearly suggests our e¢ ciency assessment methodology as extending the
existing DEA methodology by explicitly recognizing the multi-output nature of production
(in terms of output-speci￿c technologies that are interdependent through jointly used inputs).
3.4 Extensions
Similar to Section 2, we conclude by considering several extensions of our multi-output frame-
work that can build on its technical e¢ ciency (or envelopment) formulation as elaborated
above. In particular, drawing on the existing DEA literature, we discuss alternative ways
to include additional structure in the e¢ ciency evaluation, so as to obtain a strengthened
e¢ ciency evaluation.
First, at the end of Section 2, we indicated the possibility to include restrictions on the
shadow prices when computing the cost e¢ ciency measure d CEt on the basis of problem LP-2.
Next, using a procedure outlined by Cook, Habadou and Teunter (2000), we showed how one
can deal with unobserved output-speci￿c input vectors in practical applications of problem
LP-2. Clearly, given that the problems LP-2 and LP-3 are dual to each other, it is also
possible to include corresponding restrictions in the calculation of the technical e¢ ciency
measure d TEt.12
Next, our preceding analysis (only) assumed that input requirement sets are nested,
monotone and convex. Actually, when adopting an envelopment orientation, DEA applica-
tions often use additional production assumptions related to the nature of the returns-to-scale
(i.e. constant, decreasing or increasing).13 To keep our discussion simple, we abstract from
explicitly discussing such additional assumptions here. However, it is worth emphasizing
that these assumptions can be incorporated into our method.
More speci￿cally, alternative returns-to-scale assumptions can be implemented in LP-3
by including additional (linear) restrictions de￿ned by Bogetoft (1996). This author focused
on (DEA-based) linear programming problems that are formally close to our problem LP-3.
Actually, the only di⁄erence between our envelopment DEA setting and Bogetoft￿ s original
setting pertains exactly to our explicit modeling of speci￿c production technologies for indi-
vidual outputs.14 But this di⁄erence does not interfere with the applicability of Bogetoft￿ s
extensions in our multi-output framework. An attractive feature of our multi-output frame-
work is that it allows for invoking di⁄erent returns-to-scale assumptions for di⁄erent outputs
m.
12See also Podinovski (2004) for a discussion on incorporating weight restrictions in (dual) DEA problems
such as LP-3.
13See, for example, Cooper, Seiford and Tone (2000) for a detailed discussion of returns-to-scale assump-
tions that are frequently used in DEA applications.
14More speci￿cally, Bogetoft also considers empirical feasibility sets that are constructed as convex-
montone hulls based on observed input vectors. In fact, one can verify that in the case of a single output
(i.e. M = 1) our setting coincides with the one of Bogetoft.
154 Application
In this section, we demonstrate the practical applicability of our methodology by means of a
unique data set collected from the Activity Based Costing (ABC) system of a large service
company. As an introduction, we ￿rst discuss how ABC systems allow for de￿ning output-
speci￿c and joint inputs. Then, we introduce our data and present our e¢ ciency results. We
conclude our application by illustrating the managerial implications of our newly developed
methodology. Throughout, we will focus on the (primal) cost e¢ ciency representation of our
methodology, which we introduced in Section 2. A main motivation is that this represen-
tation allows for decomposing (multi-output) cost e¢ ciency in terms of output-speci￿c cost
e¢ ciencies (see our discussion of (6)), and this decomposition will be particularly relevant
when considering the managerial implications of the e¢ ciency assessment.
At this point, it is worth to recall that in Sections 2.5 and 3.4 we mentioned di⁄erent
possible extensions of our methodology. One such extension will be useful for our following
application. Speci￿cally, as will indicate, our cost e¢ ciency analysis will evaluate the inputs
by shadow prices that are subject to price constraints (so excluding unrealistic input prices).
The other methodological extensions are not directly relevant for the current application.
For example, our use of ABC data makes that we observe the output-speci￿c input vectors,
and so we do not need the procedure of Cook, Habadou and Teunter (2000) and Cook and
Habadou (2001) (which we discussed in Section 2.5). Next, for the production setting of the
service company under evaluation, we are not aware of any a priori argument or empirical
evidence that motivates a speci￿c (constant, decreasing or increasing) returns-to-scale as-
sumption. Therefore, we choose not to impose such an assumption here, to avoid the risk of
distorting our e¢ ciency analysis by using a wrong (and unveri￿able) production assumption.
However, it should be clear from our discussion in Section 3.4 that it is actually possible to
include speci￿c returns-to-scale assumptions (in applications where such assumptions can be
convincingly motivated).
4.1 Input allocation with ABC data
For important strategic decisions such as pricing, product development and product mix
decisions, managers need information about the inputs that are consumed by the di⁄erent
outputs. As the allocation of inputs to outputs is not perfectly observable, managers have
to rely on the way in which the costing system allocates inputs to outputs. Activity Based
Costing (ABC) is a well-known costing methodology and has gained popularity during the
last two decades. In an ABC analysis, inputs (or costs) are ￿rst allocated to activities
by means of resource drivers. In a second stage, the cost of the activities is allocated to
the outputs (or products) by means of activity drivers. The selection of resource drivers,
activities, and activity drivers is based on a detailed analysis of the production process.
Figure 1 presents a graphical representation of an ABC system.
-Insert Figure 1 about here -
In an ABC system, outputs can be considered as consumers of activities and activities
can be considered as consumers of inputs. This implies that outputs can be entirely written
16in terms of activities and in terms of inputs. Thus, by relying on ABC systems, we know
how much of an input is used for the production of a certain output. In other words, ABC
systems generate information about the input decomposition, which is the distinguishing
feature of our newly developed methodology.
Although other costing methodologies also provide information about the allocation of
inputs to outputs, there are at least three reasons why our newly developed methodology
is more complementary with ABC than with other costing methodologies.15 First, ABC
systems are especially useful for complex production processes with multiple inputs and
multiple outputs (see Cooper and Kaplan (1988, 1998)). Such complex production processes
are also the focus of our newly developed methodology. Second, it has been shown that, in
case of complex production processes, ABC systems are more accurate and lead to better
decisions than other costing methodologies (see, for instance, Cardinaels, Roodhooft and
Warlop (2004)). Speci￿cally, the inclusion of activities leads to a better approximation of the
underlying production process resulting in more accurate information about the allocation
of inputs to outputs without having to rely on (unveri￿able) assumptions regarding the
production technology.16 Third, ABC systems also enable us to distinguish between output-
speci￿c inputs and joint inputs. Speci￿cally, while ABC systems provide a way to allocate
inputs to outputs, ABC systems also recognize that some inputs cannot be allocated to
the outputs in an accurate way because they lack a direct relationship with the activities
and outputs (see Cooper and Kaplan (1991, 1998)) . Such inputs are called ￿facility-level￿
inputs. The compensation of the DMU management and the costs for maintenance of the
buildings of the DMU are examples of ￿facility-level￿inputs. As e¢ ciency assessments can
be biased by allocating inputs that have no cause-and-e⁄ect relationship with the outputs, it
is appropriate to consider ￿facility-level￿inputs as joint inputs in the e¢ ciency assessment.
4.2 Data
Our empirical application uses data from a large service company active in a European
country. It delivers its services to the end customer through 290 o¢ ces (i.e. DMUs) that
are spread among the country. The o¢ ces only di⁄er from each other in terms of their size,
which is linked to the size and the population density of the geographical area they operate
in. Further, all 290 o¢ ces can deliver the same 7 standardized outputs to the end customer,
with the corresponding output targets exogenously given (i.e. DMU managers do not have
control over the output quantities). As a result, the goal of each o¢ ce is cost minimization
for a given output, which complies with the cost-oriented approach of our methodology.
The company under investigation has its own ABC system, which is implemented at
the o¢ ce level. This implies that we have information about the inputs, resource drivers,
15Other costing methodologies are mainly volume-based rather than activity-based. In volume-based
costing systems, the inputs (or costs) are allocated to the outputs based on the produced quantities of the
di⁄erent outputs. For instance, if the quantity of an output is 70% of the total quantity of outputs, 70% of
the costs are allocated to that output.
16Remark that ABC systems do not provide perfect information about the decomposition of inputs to
outputs (see, for example, Datar and Gupta (1994) and Labro and Vanhoucke (2007)). Perfect information
is not available in general or not available at a reasonable cost. ABC systems are considered as the most
accurate approximation of the decomposition of inputs to outputs (see, for example, Bhimani, Horngren,
Datar, and Foster (2007)).
17costs of activities, activity drivers and outputs for each DMU. The ABC system consists of
7 inputs (i.e. cost categories), 7 activities and 7 outputs. Each DMU uses three types of
inputs: labor, transport, and other overhead costs. More speci￿cally, the model contains 3
categories of labor, 3 categories of transport, and 1 category of other overhead costs. The
labor and transport subcategories di⁄er from each other in terms of their relationship with the
activities. We treat them as distinct inputs because pooling heterogeneous cost categories can
decrease the accuracy of the costing system (Labro and Vanhoucke 2007). Labor categories
consist of the wages paid to di⁄erent types of employees. Transport expenditures are fuel
costs, maintenance costs and depreciation for di⁄erent types of vehicles. Other overhead
costs consist of all other expenditures made at the DMU level such as pay of the DMU
manager, maintenance of the building,... These overhead costs are a typical ￿facility-level￿
input (see Section 4.1) and will be treated as a joint input. For each DMU, we obtained
expenditure data for every input. Speci￿cally, we treat expenditures as aggregate input
quantity indices (i.e. quantities multiplied by prices, with price di⁄erences correcting quality
di⁄erences in the quantity composition). Due to con￿dentiality and strict Non-Disclosure
Agreements, we cannot provide details on the activities, which cover the entire production
process of the DMUs, and outputs of the ABC system.
Panel A of Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for the 7 inputs. The large di⁄erence
between the minimum and maximum values of the di⁄erent inputs re￿ ects a large variation
across the 290 DMUs. We should also mention that some DMUs do not use some of the
inputs 4, 5, 6 and 7. Based on the mean relative weights, we can conclude that inputs 1, 2
and 7 are most important. Panel B of Table 1 gives summary statistics for the activities.
Activities 3 and 4 are the most input consuming activities. Panel C of Table 1 shows the
summary statistics for the outputs. Output 1 is the most important output and takes an
average share of 90,78%. The other outputs seem to be far less important. At this point,
however, we note that it would be misleading to only consider this output in our e¢ ciency
analysis, as it is shrinking in volume year after year and the management is explicitly focusing
its attention towards the other outputs.
-Insert Table 1 about here -
Taken together, this empirical application is well suited for demonstrating the practical
usefulness of our newly developed e¢ ciency measurement methodology: ABC data are avail-
able at the o¢ ce level, all o¢ ces work in a standardized way, which makes them comparable
(i.e. DMUs operate in a similar technological environment), o¢ ces are quite heterogeneous
in terms of inputs used and outputs produced, and cost e¢ ciency (i.e. cost minimization for
given output targets) is an appropriate e¢ ciency concept.
4.3 E¢ ciency results
Our empirical exercise considers four di⁄erent e¢ ciency measurement models: the ￿rst three
models involve di⁄erent speci￿cations of the outputs-speci￿c and joint inputs for calculating
the (multi-output) cost e¢ ciency measure presented in Section 2 (d CEt); the fourth model
uses a standard cost e¢ ciency measure (SCEt, which we de￿ne below) and will be used as
18a benchmark model. In each model we use shadow prices to evaluate the di⁄erent inputs.
In doing so, we employ shadow price restrictions to exclude unrealistic input prices; these
restrictions have been speci￿ed in consultation with the company management.
Our ￿rst three models solve the problem LP-2 (complemented with linear shadow price
restrictions) to compute d CEt for each DMU t under di⁄erent selections of the output-speci￿c
and joint inputs. The ￿rst model (BASIC) is our core model and considers 6 output-speci￿c
inputs (input 1-6) and 1 joint input (input 7). We classi￿ed input 7 as a joint input as this
input is a facility level input (see Section 4.1). The interpretation of this model is that the
ABC system allows us to allocate 6 inputs directly to the outputs, while one input cannot
be allocated to any speci￿c output (and, thus, is ￿shared￿by the di⁄erent outputs). In the
second model (ALL_ALLOCATED) input 7 is also allocated to the outputs. By contrast,
in our third model (NONE_ALLOCATED) we do not use any information provided by the
ABC system and, thus, all inputs are treated as joint inputs. This model broadly coincides
with the model of Cherchye, De Rock and Vermeulen (2008).
We believe that it is useful to compare our ￿ndings for these three models with a ￿stan-
dard￿cost e¢ ciency measurement model, which does not consider jointly used inputs and/or
inputs allocated to speci￿c outputs. This benchmark model (BENCHMARK) is de￿ned as

































tQt; the minimal cost is de￿ned over all DMUs s that produce at least
the same amount as DMU t of all di⁄erent outputs (i.e.ys ￿ yt). The essential di⁄erence
between the measure SCEt and our multi-output cost e¢ ciency measure d CEt is that this last
measure accounts for (interdependent) output-speci￿c production technologies; this complies
with the fact that d CEt is composed of output-speci￿c cost e¢ ciency measures d CE
m
t (see 6,
except that now we decompose d CEt instead of CEt). In turn, this implies that the newly
proposed measure d CEt generally has more discriminatory power than the standard measure
SCEt (because d CEt incorporates more prior information about the underlying production
process). We will illustrate this last point in our empirical results.
For each of the four models, we consider two e¢ ciency assessment exercises. In Section
4.3.1, we present the e¢ ciency results without controlling for exogenous variables that may
have an impact on DMU e¢ ciency and without correcting for possible outlier behavior of
particular DMUs. Subsequently, Section 4.3.2 reports on a second exercise, in which we
control for population density as a relevant exogenous variable and simultaneously account
for the possibility of outlier behavior. Our selection of population density as the (sole)
exogenous variable that is controlled for is the result of consultation with the company man-
17For simplicity, we de￿ne the standard cost e¢ ciency measure without shadow prices. Including shadow
prices proceeds analogously as before. See Cherchye and Vanden Abeele (2005) for a more detailed discussion
of this cost e¢ ciency measure. These authors also provide a linear programming formulation to compute the
measure when using shadow prices for evaluating the inputs. As indicated above, we will use this shadow
price formulation in our empirical exercise, in which we will include the same shadow price restrictions as
for the other three e¢ ciency measurement models.
19agement. Next, explicitly accounting for outlier behavior should obtain e¢ ciency results
that are more robust (e.g. with respect to measurement errors for inputs and outputs, and
non-comparability of DMUs due to (unobserved) heterogeneity of the production environ-
ment). In this second exercise, we make use of a probabilistic method that has recently been
proposed in a DEA context and that is extensively discussed by Daraio and Simar (2007).18
This also shows that our new DEA-based methodology can be easily combined with this
probabilistic method (as well as with other existing DEA methodologies).
4.3.1 Without control for exogenous variables or outlier behavior
Panel A of Table 2 reports the results for the four e¢ ciency models without control for any
exogenous variable and without correction for outlier behavior in the data. Considering the
results for the BASIC-model, we ￿nd that only 10% of the DMUs are e¢ cient and that the
average cost reduction potential amounts to 20%. This last result implies that the average
o¢ ce can produce the same output with 20% fewer costs. The results for the BASIC-model
also show that this model has considerable discriminatory power. This is an interesting
property of our methodology, especially when taking into account the attractive structure of
the model (with reasonable behavioral assumptions and minimal (unveri￿able) production
assumptions; see Section 2). In economic terms, our results suggest that, at the aggregate
company level, the same output can be produced after reducing totals costs with 123.243.958
EUR. As yet another point of reference, such a cost decrease would imply an increase of the
company￿ s EBIT (i.e. earnings before interest and tax) of as much as 33%, ceteris paribus.
The results for the ALL_ALLOCATED-model, which are qualitatively similar to the
results for the BASIC-model, show that 14% of the DMUs are e¢ cient and the average
DMU can produce the same output with a cost reduction of 11%. The small di⁄erences
between the results for the ALL_ALLOCATED- and BASIC-models should not be too
surprising as the only di⁄erence between the two models lies in the treatment of input 7,
which accounts for only one sixth of the total costs (i.e. input 7 is considered as a joint
input in the BASIC-model and an output-speci￿c input in the ALL_ALLOCATED-model).
However, the di⁄erences between both models are substantial enough to make clear that the
classi￿cation of an input as joint or output-speci￿c matters for the e¢ ciency analysis and
for the conclusions that are drawn from it. As for this particular application, we prefer to
focus on the BASIC-model (and, thus, to treat input 7 as a joint input) as this model better
re￿ ects the particular environment of the company.
Next, the empirical results for the NONE_ALLOCATED-model are consistent with our
expectations. As this model puts very little prior structure by treating all inputs as joint
inputs (i.e. no input is speci￿cally allocated to the outputs), we may reasonably expect that
the model will have low explanatory power. The results show that almost 90% of the DMUs
is declared e¢ cient and the average cost reduction potential is only 2%.
Finally, we consider the results of the BENCHMARK-model, which uses the standard
cost e¢ ciency measure de￿ned in (10). We ￿nd that this model has very low discrimina-
tory power for the given data set: almost all DMUs are e¢ cient. Comparing these ￿ndings
18The original ideas of this method were presented in Cazals, Florens and Simar (2002) and Daraio and
Simar (2005).
20with our results for the BASIC- and ALL_ALLOCATED-models provides a strong em-
pirical argument pro using our newly proposed method: the explicit distinction between
output-speci￿c and joint inputs in the e¢ ciency assessment does substantially contribute to
the discriminatory power of the analysis. In turn, this also pleads for using detailed cost
accounting data (generated by an ABC system), which e⁄ectively enables such a distinction.
4.3.2 With control for population density and outlier behavior
As mentioned earlier, we also computed e¢ ciency results for the same four models when
treating population density as an exogenous variable impacting DMU e¢ ciency, and while
accounting for outlier behavior. To this end, we combined our method with the probabilistic
order-alpha method of Daouia and Simar (2007). We refer to Daouia and Simar (2007) for a
detailed treatment of the method, and restrict to sketching the main idea. The probabilistic
method starts by estimating a nonparametric kernel density function through the values
of the exogenous variable Z (in our case population density), using a bandwidth h that is
determined by cross-validation techniques. Then, it restricts the set of potential comparison
partners for each DMU t (with value Zt for the exogenous variable) to those DMUs of which
the corresponding Z value lies within the range [Zt ￿ h, Zt + h]; as a result, DMU t
will only be compared to other DMUs that have a Z value close to Zt.19 Speci￿cally, the
method repeatedly draws random subsamples (with replacement) from this restricted set of
potential comparison partners. For each draw it computes DMU t￿ s cost e¢ ciency, de￿ning a
subsample-speci￿c e¢ ciency value. The outlier-robust e¢ ciency measure is then calculated
as the average (over all draws) subsample-speci￿c e¢ ciency values. The following e¢ ciency
results pertain to this robust measure (for all four e¢ ciency measurement models under
consideration).20
Panel B of Table 2 summarizes our ￿ndings. A ￿rst observation is that the average
e¢ ciency value and the number of e¢ cient DMUs for the BASIC-model are substantially
higher than the corresponding values in Panel A of the same table (i.e. without control for
population density and outlier behavior). This suggests that di⁄erences in population density
as well as outlier behavior may have an important in￿ uence on the e¢ ciency results. However,
even if we control for these factors, our BASIC- model still has a lot of discriminatory power.
Speci￿cally, 66,55% of the DMUs are identi￿ed as cost ine¢ cient and the mean cost reduction
potential still amounts to 6%. The economic impact of this result is still signi￿cant: at the
aggregate company level, a potential cost reduction of 36.973.187 EUR could be realized
without decreasing the output level. Such a cost reduction would increase the EBIT with
10%, ceteris paribus.
Next, we ￿nd that the discriminatory power also decreased for the ALL_ALLOCATED-
and NONE_ALLOCATED-models compared to the same models without control for pop-
19To be precise, to compute CEt , the original set of comparison partners for each output m (with
corresponding CEm
t in (6)) is the set of DMUs s such that ym
s ￿ ym
t . Similarly, the original set of comparison
partners to compute SCEt is the sets of DMUs s such that ys ￿ yt (see (10)). The restricted sets of
comparison partners contain those DMUs s that additionally satisfy the requirement that Zs lies within [Zt
￿ h , Zt + h].
20In our exercise, we conducted 200 random draws for calculating these robust measures. In each draw,
the number of observations in the subsample equaled 80% of the number of observations in the restricted
set of potential comparison partners (where we round to the ￿rst higher integer if necessary).
21ulation density and outlier behavior. Generally, the results for these models yield the same
qualitative conclusions as before. First, we observe some di⁄erences between the results for
the ALL_ALLOCATED- and BASIC- models, which indicates that treating input 7 as a
joint input matters for the analysis. Second, we observe that the discriminatory power of the
NONE_ALLOCATED-model is very low, which again shows that using information about
the allocation of the output-speci￿c inputs may substantially enhance the e¢ ciency analysis.
Finally, the BENCHMARK-model with a control for population density loses all discrim-
inatory power. If one were to use this method only, it would seem as all o¢ ces are operating
e¢ ciently. Once again, this result provides a strong empirical argument for using our newly
developed e¢ ciency measurement method.
4.4 Managerial Implications
Companies often have multiple business units or o¢ ces (i.e. DMUs) that produce identical
outputs. A major task of top management is to monitor the e¢ ciency of these DMUs in
converting inputs into outputs, and to take appropriate decisions based on the e¢ ciency
assessment. Examples of such decisions are evaluation of business unit managers and the
linked bonus payments, the installment of benchmarking programs and initiation of improve-
ment actions for bad performing business units, and potentially the dismissal of business unit
managers or closing of bad performing business units.
However, accurate e¢ ciency assessment is a complex task for several reasons. First,
production processes with multiple outputs are typically characterized by inputs that can
be directly allocated to the speci￿c outputs (output-speci￿c inputs) as well as inputs that
simultaneously assist in the production of di⁄erent outputs (joint inputs). The labor cost
of employees of a department of a typical supermarket store, for instance, can be directly
attributed to the products of that department. The salary of the store manager, however,
cannot be attributed to a product or product group. The existence of joint inputs thus
necessitates the use of a method that allocates the joint inputs to the multiple outputs
in a way that does not bias the e¢ ciency assessment at the disadvantage of the business
unit. Second, business units do not produce the same output mix. Third, even standardized
business units operate in di⁄erent environments. They are subject to di⁄erent environmental
(i.e., exogenous) factors that are beyond their control but in￿ uence their e¢ ciency (e.g.
population density, average household income,...). As business units should only be held
accountable for their ine¢ ciency resulting from controllable factors, and not for the in￿ uence
of the environment they operate in, a re￿ned methodology is necessary.
We believe that our newly developed methodology has some unique bene￿ts that can
improve e¢ ciency assessments of business units and, as a consequence, ￿rm performance. A
￿rst bene￿t is that including information about the allocation of the output-speci￿c inputs
to the di⁄erent outputs substantially improves the discriminatory power of the e¢ ciency
assessment. Evidently, an e¢ ciency measurement methodology with more discriminatory
power has a greater managerial relevance, as DMU managers can only be motivated to initiate
improvement actions if their DMU is identi￿ed as ine¢ cient by the e¢ ciency assessment.
Furthermore, by treating some inputs as joint inputs and by allocating these inputs to
the outputs in a way that does not harm the e¢ ciency result of the particular business
unit, our methodology calculates e¢ ciency in a conservative way and takes into account
22the particular features of the production process. Finally, our methodology can be easily
combined with well-known extensions of DEA-based e¢ ciency assessments (e.g. to control
for exogenous factors and outlier behavior) so that the bene￿ts of these extensions also
pertain to our methodology. Taken together, assessing the e¢ ciency of DMUs by means
of our methodology will make the results of the e¢ ciency assessment more acceptable for
business unit managers, lead to more improvement actions and, consequently, higher realized
cost reductions and improved ￿rm performance.
Another interesting feature of our methodology is that it allows us to decompose the over-
all e¢ ciency value of a DMU in output-speci￿c e¢ ciency values and corresponding weights
(revealing the importance of each individual output in the overall e¢ ciency value; see our
discussion of (7) in Section 2). Such a decomposition can lead to more focused improve-
ment actions compared to approaches that do not decompose the overall e¢ ciency value.
Indeed, without a decomposition of the overall e¢ ciency value, managers of multi-output
DMUs have no clear guidance in terms of the outputs on which they should focus in order
to correct the ine¢ ciency that is detected. Taken together, the main distinguishing features
of our methodology pertain to the identi￿cation of ine¢ cient DMUs and to the fact that it
provides managers with more guidance for the installment of improvement actions.
To show the practical usefulness of the decomposition of the overall e¢ ciency value of a
DMU, we provide a speci￿c example taken from our application. Panel C of Table 2 reports
the output-speci￿c e¢ ciencies and the output weights for three DMUs (A, B and C) that
attain the same overall e¢ ciency score (i.e. 0,65). The level of the overall e¢ ciency value
indicates that each DMU can produce the same combination of outputs with a cost level that
is 35% below the current cost level. While standard methods for e¢ ciency assessment, which
typically do not decompose the overall e¢ ciency measure, would stop here, our methodology
allows us to go further by analyzing the sources of this cost ine¢ ciencies at the individual
output level.
Careful inspection of the output-speci￿c e¢ ciencies reveals some notable di⁄erences
across the three DMUs. Output 1, for instance, is produced e¢ ciently in DMU B, while
DMUs A and C turn out to be ine¢ cient in the production of this output. Considering the
weights for output 1 shows that this output is more important for DMU A (i.e. a weight of
0,51) than for DMU B and C (i.e. a weight of respectively 0,11 and 0,06). Summarizing, this
example shows that output-speci￿c e¢ ciencies and the corresponding weights can vary a lot
between DMUs, which emphasizes the importance of providing this information to managers
in order to help them to increase the e¢ ciency of their DMUs.
When considering the other outputs of the DMUs in more detail, we ￿nd that the focus
of the improvement actions may substantially vary across DMUs. For example, DMU B
is performing quite well for outputs 4 and 5 (with output 4 much more important than
output 5). By contrast, its cost e¢ ciency is much lower for output 3, which is almost as
important as output 4. However, the most problematic is output 6, which is only slightly
less important than output 3, but has dramatically low e¢ ciency. We also note that the
e¢ ciency of outputs 2 and 7 is low, but these outputs are only marginally important for the
cost e¢ ciency of DMU B. Taken together, our advice for DMU B is to focus mainly on the
production of output 6 and, to a somewhat lesser extent, output 3.
A similar analysis for DMUs A and C yields the following conclusions. First, DMU A
can improve its overall e¢ ciency by focusing on output 1, which is very important and is
23characterized by a potential cost reduction of 14%. In addition, this DMU can fruitfully
focus on a more e¢ cient production of outputs 2 and 3, which are a bit less important but
characterized by much more room for improvement than output 1. Finally, DMU C should
in particular concentrate on output 6, which is both highly important and produced quite
ine¢ ciently.
-Insert Table 2 about here -
5 Conclusion
Companies often have multiple business units in which the same outputs are produced.
Well-known examples of such companies are Walmart, Home Depot and Mc Donald￿ s. An
assessment of the e¢ ciency of the di⁄erent business units is necessary to manage such compa-
nies in an adequate way. This study develops a new DEA-based methodology that improves
the e¢ ciency measurement of multi-output DMUs and provides guidance for the improve-
ment actions to restore ine¢ ciency. The distinguishing feature of our methodology is that
we include information about the decomposition of the inputs to the outputs. Interestingly,
companies often have such information available in their ABC systems.
This new approach to e¢ ciency measurement enriches the production e¢ ciency analysis
in two di⁄erent ways. First, including information about the input decomposition substan-
tially improves the discriminatory power of the e¢ ciency assessment. Speci￿cally, our new
methodology is better able to detect productive ine¢ ciencies, which should lead to more im-
provement actions and higher realized cost savings. A second interesting contribution of our
method is that it allows for decomposing the overall e¢ ciency in output-speci￿c e¢ ciencies.
Overall cost e¢ ciency measures indicate how well a particular DMU performs in the aggre-
gate, but it does not generate any direct guidance as to which actions can e⁄ectively improve
the observed ine¢ ciencies. By contrast, output-speci￿c e¢ ciency measures e⁄ectively iden-
tify the outputs on which DMUs should focus to remedy the observed ine¢ ciency. Given
that business units typically have limited resources to remedy ine¢ ciencies, our methodology
helps to better allocate these scarce resources to the outputs that contribute the most to the
ine¢ ciency that is observed. Summarizing, our methodology will lead to more improvement
actions as well as more focused improvement actions.
We see multiple avenues for follow-up research. First, at a methodological level, our
approach allows for a richer type of e¢ ciency analysis, because it explicitly recognizes that
di⁄erent outputs are characterized by own production technologies that may be interdepen-
dent because of jointly used inputs. As we indicated at the end of Section 2.1, evaluating
the joint inputs by using output-speci￿c implicit prices (that add up to the observed prices)
corresponds to a Pareto e¢ cient use of these inputs. Instead of Pareto e¢ ciency, one may
also assume a Nash equilibrium allocation for multi-output production (which need not nec-
essarily be Pareto e¢ cient). Here, one may fruitfully build on Cherchye, Demuynck and De
Rock (2011), who considered this Nash equilibrium criterion in a formally close consumption
setting.21 More generally, we believe that our modeling of output-speci￿c production tech-
21See also Cherchye, Demuynck, De Rock and De Witte (2011) for related discussion.
24nologies opens the way for a whole new spectrum of applications of multi-output e¢ ciency
analysis.
Next, as for empirical applications, we have suggested using ABC data to obtain infor-
mation about the decomposition of the output-speci￿c inputs to the di⁄erent outputs. In
this respect, previous research has shown that the accuracy of ABC systems depends on the
characteristics of the economic environment, such as diversity in the resource consumption
patterns (Labro and Vanhoucke 2007). Future research could investigate how the accuracy
of costing systems and the determinants thereof in￿ uence the accuracy of the e¢ ciency
assessments. More broadly, we have only scratched the surface in exploring the interface
betwen operations research and cost accounting, and the opportunities for future research
are enormous.
References
[1] Afriat, S. 1972. E¢ ciency Estimation of Production Functions. International Economic
Review 13 568-598.
[2] Allen, R., A.D. Athanassopoulos, R.G. Dyson, E. Thanassoulis. 1997. Weight Restric-
tions and Value Judgements in DEA: Evolution, Development and Future Directions.
Annals of Operations Research 73 13-34.
[3] Beasley, J.E. 1995. Determining teaching and research e¢ ciencies, Journal of the Oper-
ational Research Society 46, 441￿ 452.
[4] Banker, R.D., A. Maindiratta. 1988. Nonparametric Analysis of Technical and Allocative
E¢ ciencies in Production. Econometrica 56 1315-1332.
[5] Bhimani, A., C.T. Horngren, S. Datar, G. Foster. 2007. Management and cost account-
ing. Financial Times Press
[6] Bogetoft, P. 1996. DEA on relaxed convexity assumptions. Management Science 42
457-465.
[7] Cardinaels, E., F. Roodhooft, L. Warlop. 2004. Customer pro￿tability analysis reports
for resource allocation: the role of complex marketing environments. Abacus 40 238-258.
[8] Cazals, S., J.P. Florens, L. Simar. 2002. Nonparametric Frontier Estimation: A Robust
Approach. Journal of Econometrics 106 1-25.
[9] Charnes, A., W.W. Cooper. 1962. Programming with linear fractional functionals. Naval
Research Logistics Quarterly 9 181￿ 186.
[10] Charnes, A., W.W. Cooper, E. Rhodes. 1978. Measuring the E¢ ciency of Decision
Making Units. European Journal of Operational Research 2 429-444.
[11] Cherchye, L., P. Vanden Abeele. 2005. On Research E¢ ciency: A Micro-Analaysis of
Dutch University Research in Economics and Business Management. Research Policy
34 495-516.
25[12] Cherchye, L., T. Demuynck, B. De Rock. 2011. Revealed preference analysis of nonco-
operative household consumption. Economic Journal 121 1073-1096.
[13] Cherchye, Demuynck, De Rock and De Witte. 2011. Nonparametric analysis of multi-
output production with joint inputs. Working paper. (Under revision for Economic Jour-
nal.)
[14] Cherchye, L., B. De Rock, F. Vermeulen. 2007. The collective model of household con-
sumption: a nonparametric characterization. Econometrica 75 553-574.
[15] Cherchye, L., B. De Rock, F. Vermeulen. 2008. Analyzing Cost-E¢ cient Production Be-
havior Under Economies of Scope: A Nonparametric Methodology. Operations Research
56 204-221.
[16] Cherchye, L., B. De Rock, F. Vermeulen. 2011. The revealed preference approach to
collective consumption behavior: testing and sharing rule recovery. Review of Economic
Studies 78 176-198.
[17] Cherchye, L., W. Moesen, N. Rogge, T. Van Puyenbroeck. 2007. An introduction to
￿ bene￿t of the doubt￿composite indicators. Social Indicators Research 82 111-145.
[18] Chiappori, P.-A. 1988. Rational household labor supply. Econometrica 56 63-89.
[19] Cook, W.D., M. Habadou, H.J.H Teunter. 2000. Multicomponent e¢ ciency measure-
ment and shared inputs in data envelopment analysis: an application to sales and service
performance in bank branches. Journal of Productivity Analysis 14 209-224.
[20] Cook, W.D., M. Hababou. 2001. Sales performance measurement in bank branches,
OMEGA 29, 299￿ 307.
[21] Cook, W.D., R.H. Green. 2004. Multicomponent e¢ ciency measurement and core busi-
ness identi￿cation in multiplant ￿rms: A DEA model, European Journal of Operational
Research 157, 540￿ 551.
[22] Cook, W.D., L.M. Seiford. 2009. Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) ￿Thirty years on.
European Journal of Operational Research 192 1-17.
[23] Cooper, R., R.S. Kaplan. 1988. Measure Costs Right: Make The Right Decisions. Har-
vard Business Review 67 (September-October) 96-105.
[24] Cooper, R., R.S. Kaplan. 1991. Pro￿t priorities from Activity Based Costing. Harvard
Business Review 70 (May-June): 130-135.
[25] Cooper, R., R.S. Kaplan. 1998. Cost & E⁄ect: Using Integrated Cost Systems to Drive
Pro￿tability and Performance. Harvard Business School Press.
[26] Cooper, W.W., L.M. Seiford, K. Tone. 2000. Data Envelopment Analysis: A Compre-
hensive Text with Models, Applications, References and DEA-Solver Software. Kluwer
Academic Publishers.
26[27] Datar, S., M. Gupta. 1994. Aggregation, speci￿cation, and measurement errors in prod-
uct costing. The Accounting Review 69 567-592.
[28] Daouia, A., L. Simar, 2007. Nonparametric e¢ ciency analysis: A multivariate condi-
tional quantile approach. Journal of Econometrics 140 375-400.
[29] Daraio, C., L. Simar. 2005. Introducing environmental variables in nonparametric fron-
tier models: a probabilistic approach. Journal of Productivity Analysis 24 93-121.
[30] Daraio, C., L. Simar. 2007. Advanced Robust and Nonparametric Methods in E¢ ciency
Analysis. Methodology and Applications. Springer.
[31] Diewert, W.E., C. Parkan. 1983. Linear Programming Tests of Regularity Conditions for
Production Frontiers. In Quantitative Studies on Production and Prices (W. Eichhorn,
R. Henn, K. Neumann and R.W. Shephard, Eds.), Physica-Verlag.
[32] F￿re, R., S. Grosskopf, C.A.K. Lovell. 1994. Production Frontiers. Cambridge University
Press.
[33] Fried, H., C.A.K. Lovell, S. Schmidt. 2008. The Measurement of Productive E¢ ciency
and Productivity Change. Oxford University Press.
[34] Gosselin, M. 2007. A Review of Activity-Based Costing: Technique, Implementation
and Consequences. In Handbook of Management Accounting Research, edited by C.S.
Chapman, A.G. Hopwood, and M.D. Shields. Elsevier.
[35] Hanoch, G., M. Rothschild. 1972. Testing Assumptions of Production Theory: A Non-
parametric Approach. Journal of Political Economy 80 256-275.
[36] Kuosmanen, T., L. Cherchye, T. Sipil￿inen. 2006. The Law of one Price in Data En-
velopment Analysis: Restricting Weight Flexibility across Firms. European Journal of
Operational Research 170 735-757.
[37] Labro, E., and M. Vanhoucke. 2007. A Simulation Analysis of Interactions among Errors
in Costing Systems. The Accounting Review 82 939-962.
[38] Myles, G.D. 1995. Public Economics. Cambridge University Press.
[39] Pedraja-Chaparro, F., J. Salinas-Jimenez, P. Smith. 1997. On the Role of Weight Re-
strictions in Data Envelopment Analysis. Journal of Productivity Analysis 8 215-230.
[40] Petersen, N.C. 1990. Data envelopment analysis on a relaxed set of assumptions. Man-
agement Science 36 305-314.
[41] Podinovski V. 2004. Production trade-o⁄s and weight restrictions in data envelopment
analysis. Journal of the Operational Research Society 55 1311￿ 1322.
[42] Tulkens, H.. 1993. On FDH Analysis: Some Methodological Issues and Applications to
Retail Banking, Courts and Urban Transit. Journal of Productivity Analysis 4 183-210.
[43] Varian, H.R.. 1984. The Non-Parametric Approach to Production Analysis. Economet-
rica 52 579-598.
27Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1




+ (1 ￿ m ￿ M ) such that, for each output m, it holds that:
if, for some DMU s, ym
s ￿ ym













t is multi-output cost e¢ cient, conditions (CE-1) and (CE-2) in De￿nition 2 are satis￿ed.





















































which gives the wanted result.
As a second step, we show that DMU t is multi-output cost e¢ cient (i.e. conditions



















Qs. To show the result, for each output m and DMU










m;Qs ￿ Qg, (13)
for D
m





In words, this input requirement set is constructed as the (positive) monotone hull of the
input vectors (qm
s ; Qs) associated with all DMUs s that produce at least the output ym
t (i.e.
s 2 Dm
t ).22 By their very construction, these input requirement sets meet condition (CE-1)
in De￿nition 2 (i.e. they are nested and satisfy (qm
t ;Qt) 2 Im(ym
t )).























this directly follows from the monotone hull construction of Im(ym
t ) in (13).23 Because
22Here, it is worth to indicate that, in principle, we could also have obtained our result by using the
convex-monotone hull construction of the same input vectors (qm
s ; Qs) (which we consider in Section 3 of
the main text; see (8)). However, for the purpose of proving Proposition 2, it su¢ ces to use the monotone
hull construction in (13).


























Qs for any s 2 Dm
t , and using that t 2 Dm
t by construction,






























Proof of Proposition 2
We ￿rst need to verify that b Im (ym
t ) satis￿es Axioms 1-4. For Axioms 2, 3 and 4 the result
follows directly from the de￿nition of b Im (ym
t ) (in (8)) as the convex-monotone hull of the
DMUs s in the set Dm
t (where we obtain Axiom 4 by noting that, by construction, t 2 Dm
t ).










s g), which in turn implies Im(ym) ￿ Im(ym).
It remains to prove that, for any Im (ym
t ) that satis￿es Axioms 1-4, we have b Im (ym
t ) ￿
Im (ym
t ). Consider any (qm
￿ ;Q￿) 2 b Im (ym
t ): We must prove that (qm
￿ ;Q￿) 2 Im (ym
t ). As a
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We can now prove (qm
￿ ;Q￿) 2 Im (ym
t ) by using that Im (ym
t ) satis￿es the Axioms 1-4. As a
￿rst step, we note that Axiom 4 implies
(q
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Proof of Proposition 3
The result follows from the fact that problem LP-3 is dual to problem LP-2, using the duality
theorem of linear programming.
30FIGURE 1: ABC model
31TABLE 1: Summary statistics for input, activities, and outputs
Input 1 Input 2 Input 3 Input 4 Input 5 Input 6 Input 7
Minimum 2.300,53 6.522,28 2.402,56 0 0 0 0
1st Quartile 416.512,75 178.020,86 27.060,68 16.722,70 861,31 99,13 8.224,88
Median 681.166,76 346.869,95 50.897,87 38.132,60 3.913,21 965,87 18.776,13
3rd Quartile 1.235.242,32 641.469,51 96.741,76 69.255,21 10.609,42 5.327,23 84.246,26
Maximum 7.852.652,61 3.106.230,50 807.476,34 512.198,29 50.478,14 555.005,36 5.836.885,80
Mean 1.083.253,08 511.329,46 88.798,65 57.454,91 7.351,60 29.023,07 347.685,06
Stddev 1.256.051,39 493.970,15 113.984,00 68.758,95 9.163,86 76.749,02 873.538,76
Mean
Relative
Weight 0,51 0,24 0,04 0,03 0 0,01 0,16
Activity 1 Activity 2 Activity 3 Activity 4 Activity 5 Activity 6 Activity 7
Minimum 50.715,01 16.633,58 109.033,49 83.422,97 57.595,20 660,08 28.828,71
1st Quartile 134.417,95 44.086,60 272.126,91 221.109,00 152.653,60 1.749,52 76.409,25
Median 208.236,47 68.297,70 432.590,15 342.535,79 236.486,62 2.710,31 118.371,04
3rd Quartile 365.520,84 119.884,06 763.735,28 601.258,59 415.108,78 4.757,45 207.778,59
Maximum 1.646.721,96 540.094,28 3.239.597,01 2.708.753,15 1.870.122,49 21.432,96 936.071,30
Mean 314.939,21 103.294,23 647.817,50 518.055,03 357.665,06 4.099,10 179.025,71
Stddev 298.032,42 97.749,11 601.898,45 490.244,43 338.464,63 3.879,05 169.415,12
Mean
Relative
Weight 0,15 0,05 0,3 0,24 0,17 0 0,08
Output 1 Output 2 Output 3 Output 4 Output 5 Output 6 Output 7
Minimum 5.647,86 0 0 11,97 2,06 33,25 2,68
1st Quartile 17.351,95 0 65,75 67,88 7,2 117,18 140,65
Median 28.991,22 0 1.501,44 99,32 13,69 206,15 240,37
3rd Quartile 48.648,71 0 3.240,62 159,19 23,09 369,07 458,22
Maximum 167.844,62 70 28.251,79 837,27 78,42 5.515,25 4.171,21
Mean 37.935,31 0,93 2.859,37 134,84 18,22 382,28 456,77
Stddev 30.129,41 5,28 4.540,18 108,95 14,95 574,87 644
Mean
Relative
Weight 0,91 0 0,07 0 0 0,01 0,01
PANEL A: SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR INPUTS
PANEL B: SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR ACTIVITIES
PANEL C: SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR OUTPUTS
































PANEL C: DECOMPOSITION OF OVERALL EFFICIENCY FOR THREE DMUS (weights between brackets)
Overall Output1 Output3 Output5 Output6
Percentage 33,45% 16,21% 93,10% 100% -
Number 97 47 270 290 -
Efficient DMUs
Stdev 0,1 0,1 0,05 0 38,9
Mean 0,94 0,91 0,99 1 33,9
Maximum 1 1 1 1 253,5
3rd Quartile 1 0,97 1 1 34,2
Median 0,98 0,93 1 1 22,2
1st Quartile 0,92 0,88 1 1 16,5
Minimum 0,43 0,42 0,59 1 5,2
PANEL B: EFFICIENCY RESULTS WITH CONTROL FOR POPULATION DENSITY AND OUTLIER BEHAVIOR
Efficiency measure BASIC ALL_ALLO C ATED NONE_ALLOCATED BENCHMARK PO P.DENS ITY
Number 29 40 259 285
Percentage 10,00% 13,79% 89,31% 98,28%
Stdev 0,18 0,12 0,07 0,03
Efficient DMUs
Maximum 1 1 1 1
Mean 0,8 0,89 0,98 1
Median 0,83 0,92 1 1
3rd Quartile 0,96 0,97 1 1
Minimum 0,23 0,3 0,52 0,61
1st Quartile 0,68 0,86 1 1
PANEL A: EFFICIENCY RESULTS WITHOUT CONTROL FOR POPULATION DENSITY AND OUTLIER BEHAVIOR
Efficiency measure BASIC ALL_ALLO C ATED NONE_ALLOCATED BENCHMARK
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